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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper is about internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat. It has three aims. The
first is to develop an argument against internalism to the effect that the correct epistemology of
defeat must be externalist (Section 1). The second is to show that cases involving defeat also cause
trouble for phenomenal conservatism (Sections 2 and 3). The third is to cast doubt on the idea
that phenomenal conservatism might work as a specific thesis about the status of seemings of
particular kinds as justifiers. In particular, I will ask whether perceptual seemings might still be
justifiers and provide some reason for pessimism (Section 4).
2 INTERNALISM
Internalism in epistemology is the view that epistemic justification strongly supervenes on the
internal in that any two possible agents who are exactly alike internally are exactly alike justifi-
cationally.1 Externalism is the view that internalism is false. In this section, I will argue that the
phenomenon of defeat means trouble for internalism. In other words, the correct epistemology of
defeat is an externalist one.
Very roughly, a defeater for p undermines at least some reason one may have for believing that
p.2 There are at least two different kinds of defeater: rebutting and undercutting (there may be
others as well). A rebutting defeater for p does its work by providing one with a reason for not-p.
Suppose you believe that your colleague is currently on holiday in Italy because they told you last
week that they would leave yesterday and would be away for two weeks. When today you see that
they are at work, you have a rebutting defeater for believing that they are currently on holiday in
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Italy. An undercutting defeater works by depriving one’s reason for believing p of its supporting
powers. Suppose you see that your colleague’s suit is blue. When you are told that the coffee you
just drank contains a drug that messes with your colour vision, you have an undercutting defeater
for believing that your colleague’s suit is blue.
Defeaters can themselves be defeated. A defeater defeater for p undermines a defeater one has
for p. In the above colour case, finding out that the personwho told you that your coffee contained
a drug lied provides you with a defeater for your defeater for believing that your colleague’s suit
is blue.
Onemay have several reasons for believing p. While having a defeater for p means that some of
one’s reasons for believing p are undermined, it does not entail that one does not have any reason
for believing that p. In fact, itmay still be that one has plenty of reason for believing that p, enough,
in fact, to know that p. In the above colour vision case, you may still know that your colleague’s
suit is blue because they told you so. And since one knows that p only if one has justification for
believing that p, having a defeater for p is compatible with having justification for believing that
p. In the colour vision case, you not only know that your colleague’s suit is blue, you also have
justification for believing that it is.
While it is worth noting that having defeaters for p is compatible with knowing that p and hav-
ing justification for believing that p, there are plenty of cases in which defeaters undermine not
only some reason one has for believing that p but also one’s knowledge and justification for believ-
ing that p. For instance, in the holiday case, the defeater for believing that your friend is currently
on holiday in Italy not only undermines some reason you have for believing that they are but also
your knowledge and your justification for this belief. Since the cases I will be interested in here all
involve defeat of the knowledge and justification undermining variety, I will set cases involving
defeat with knowledge/justification aside here. As a result, for the purposes of this paper, it will
be safe to assume that the relevant instances of the following principle are all true:
Justification-Defeat. If one has justification that p, then one does not have an undefeated
defeater for p.
With these points in play, consider the following case:
Case A. X has recently ingested a new recreational drug that X was promised to have
an incredible high. The drug causes X to have a range of false beliefs, including that
they are a doctor at the local hospital and that they have just received notice to per-
form an emergency surgery in OR1. Whilst preparing for surgery, X is approached by
a person whom, thanks to the influence of the drug, X falsely believes to be a notori-
ous drug abuser and disruptive element in the hospital. (In fact, the person is a doctor
at the hospital.) The person tells X: “You are not a doctor. Please step away from the
patient.”
The testimony that X is not a doctor is a defeater for X’s belief that they are a doctor. Here is
the key observation about Case A: X’s drug-induced false beliefs about being a doctor and the
testifier’s being a notorious drug abuser and disruptive element in the hospital do not defeat this
defeater. By Justification-Defeat, X’s belief that they are a doctor is not justified.
Consider next:
Case B. Y is a doctor at the local hospital who knows that they are. Y has just received
notice to perform an emergency surgery in OR1. Whilst preparing for surgery, Y is
approached by a personwhomY recognises as a notorious drug abuser and disruptive
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element at the hospital. The person tells Y: “You are not a doctor. Please step away
from the patient.”
Again, the testimony that Y is not a doctor is a defeater for Y’s belief that they are a doctor.
Here is the key observation about Case B: Y’s knowledge about being a doctor and the testifier’s
being a notorious drug abuser and disruptive element in the hospital does defeat this defeater.
Compatibly with Justification-Defeat, Y’s belief that they are a doctor continues to be justified.
What the two key observations show is that there is an important asymmetry between Cases A
and B. In Case B, Y does have justification that they are a doctor despite the testimony, whereas,
in Case A, X does not. Unfortunately for internalists, they cannot accommodate this asymmetry.
This is because we may assume that X and Y are internal duplicates. They are internally exactly
alike (thanks to the effects the drug had on X in Case A). Accordingly, internalism entails that
they must be justificationally alike also. Cases of defeat mean trouble for internalism.
Onemight wonder whether internalists couldn’t respond as follows. Since X and Y are internal
duplicates, they have the same evidence. In particular, in Case A, X will have ostensible memo-
ries that they are a doctor and that the person approaching them is a notorious drug abuser and
disruptive element. But if so, X can dismiss the defeater after all. As a result, they continue to
justifiably believe that they are a doctor after all.3
I do not mean to deny that X can go ahead and dismiss the defeater in the way indicated. But
if X’s ostensible memories provide X with a genuine defeater defeater, they must justify X in dis-
missing the defeater. The question remains, however, whether this is the case. My intuition is it
is not. The fact that a knowledgeable doctor tells X that they are not a doctor provides a defeater
that X’s drug-induced ostensible memories do not enable X to justifiably dismiss.
If this case doesn’t elicit this intuition in you, consider:
Case C. As a result of ingesting a new recreational drug with an incredible high, Z
has ostensible memories and a corresponding belief that his Greek lover (who in fact
is Z’s Czech flatmate) wants to sleep with him. When Z attempts to initiate sexual
intercourse with her, he interprets the Czech ‘ne’ which means ‘no’ as the phoneti-
cally very similar (and to Z indistinguishable) Greek ‘nai’ which means ‘yes’.
There can be no question that, in this case, when Z’s flatmate says no, this provides a defeater
for Z’s belief that she wants to sleep with him. More importantly yet, Z’s drug-induced ostensible
memories do not enable Z to justifiably dismiss this defeater. They do not constitute a genuine
defeater defeater. As a result, Z does not justifiably believe that his flatmate wants to sleep with
him.
Just as the Z’s drug-induced ostensible memories don’t constitute a genuine defeater defeater
because they don’t allow him to justifiably dismiss the defeater provided by his flatmate’s word
in Case C, so X’s drug-induced ostensible memories don’t either because they don’t allow X to
justifiably dismiss the defeater provided by the doctor’s testimony in Case A. Just as Z’s belief in
Case C is not justified, X’s belief that they are a doctor in Case A is not justified either.4
But doesn’t that serve to point the way forward for the internalist? Since it turns out that X’s
belief is not justified, should internalists just hold that Y’s belief isn’t either?
No. If assertions by people whom we know to be deranged can defeat our best justified beliefs,
defeat is much too easy to come by, and scepticism looms across a range of important subject
matters, including climate change, the reality of systemic racism, and the seriousness of theCovid-
19 pandemic, to name but a few. By the same token, holding that Y’s belief that he is a doctor isn’t
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justified in Case B because the word of person whom Y knows to be a notorious drug abuser
defeats their belief isn’t an option either.5
In sum, what these considerations suggest is that, in Case A, X cannot justifiably dismiss the
defeater for their belief that they are a doctor. They do not have a genuine defeater defeater and
that, as a result, their belief is not justified. At the same time, in Case B, Y can justifiably dismiss
the defeater for their belief that they are a doctor. They do have a genuine defeater defeater. As
a result, their belief is justified. Since X and Y are internal duplicates, cases of defeat do mean
trouble for internalism after all. By the same token, there is reason to believe that the correct
epistemology of defeat will have to be an externalist one.
3 CLASSIC PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM
According to phenomenal conservatism it is a bedrock epistemic principle that seemings are jus-
tifiers, one that features in epistemic explanations of the most fundamental kinds. It is easy to see
that phenomenal conservatism is compatible with internalism, as seemings are internalistically
respectable in the relevant sense. Phenomenal conservatism offers an attractive solution to the
regress problem in epistemology according to which seemings are the regress stoppers and offers
the perhaps most popular general theory of basic justification among contemporary internalists.
While phenomenal conservatism is compatible with internalism and indeed typically endorsed
by internalists, it is worth noting that one might be a phenomenal conservative without being
an internalist. In particular, one might take the above argument to succeed in showing that the
correct epistemology of defeat must be externalist and hold on to the key thesis of phenomenal
conservatism that seemings are justifiers. In this way, phenomenal conservatism might allow its
champions to hold on at least to a limited form of internalism. The aim of this section is to show
that cases of defeat also serve to cause trouble for phenomenal conservatism.
To begin with, consider the following dummy version of the view:
Dummy PC. If it seems to one that p, then one has justification for believing that p.
Dummy PC is false. To see why, consider:
Case 1. A is an agent to whom it seems that every woman is less intelligent than any
man (= P1), that TheresaMay is a Chiquita banana (= P2) and that their only dining
table is both round and square ( = P3).
These seemings do not give A justification for believing the corresponding propositions. In fact,
the case of A is as compelling a counterexample to Dummy PC as they get in philosophy.
It will come as no surprise, then, that phenomenal conservatives do not espouse Dummy PC.
Instead they go for the following weaker principle:
PC. If it seems to one that p, then one has prima facie justification for believing that p.6
According to PC, seemings continue to be justifiers. Crucially, however, they are defeasible
justifiers. If one has a seeming that p, one has justification for believing that p unless one’s justi-
fication for believing that p is defeated. Let’s grant phenomenal conservatives that, thanks to the
additional clause, PC can get Case 1 right.7
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Consider, next, the following case:
Case 2. B is an agent who is exactly like A with one exception: it also seems to B that
all defeaters for believing what seems to them to be the case are misleading.8
By PC, B has prima facie justification for believing that all defeaters for believing what seems
to them to be the case are misleading. But given that this is so, it cannot be that it seems to B
that p and B’s prima facie justification for p is defeated. This is because the defeating power of
any candidate defeater is undercut by the justificatory power of the seeming that all defeaters for
believing what seems to B to be the case are misleading. In other words, the fact that it seems to
B that all defeaters for believing what seems to them to be the case are misleading means that B
has a defeater defeater for any defeater for believing what seems to B to be the case. This gives us
the following:
PC’sKeyCommitment. For B, prima facie justificationwill always convert to ultima
facie justification: if it seems to B that p, then B has justification for believing p.
With PC’s Key Commitment in play, let’s return to the counterexamples to Dummy PC. Recall
that A’s seemings that P1, P2 and P3 do not give A justification for believing the corresponding
propositions. Recall also that B is just like A except that it also seems to B that any defeater for
believing what seems to B to be the case must be misleading. Crucially, there is excellent reason
to believe that this additional seeming does not improve B’s epistemic state compared to A’s; if
anything, it makes it worse. If this isn’t immediately obvious, take a moment to reflect on whose
epistemic state you’d rather be in. I, for one, take it to be a complete no-brainer that the choice
is not going to be B; if anything, it’s going to be A rather than B. But, of course, what one has
justification for believing supervenes on one’s epistemic state. Given (i) that B is just like A except
for one additional seeming B has; (ii) that this additional seeming does not improve B’s epistemic
state compared to A’s; and (iii) that what one has justification for believing supervenes on one’s
epistemic state, it follows that whatever B has justification for believing, A does, too. Since A
doesn’t have justification for believing P1, P2 and P3, neither does B. And since that’s incompatible
with PC’s Key Commitment, PC is in trouble.9
Beforemoving on, I’d like to consider a few responses on behalf of champions of PC. Here is the
first. If B’s seeming that all defeaters for believing what seems to B to be the case are misleading is
a defeater defeater, then it is a defeater itself. If so, isn’t this defeater defeated by the rebutter this
is a defeater and it’s not misleading?10
No. This is because, while B’s seeming is indeed a defeater, its content doesn’t hold that all
defeaters are misleading but only that all defeaters for believing what seems to B to be the case are.
What’s more, since the seeming is not a defeater for believing anything that seems to B to be the
case, it will not be rebutted in the way envisaged.
Second, might champions of PC not resist the existence of ‘supercharged’ defeaters such as the
one that B has in Case 2. Suppose you acquire evidence that you are in a state of global hallucina-
tion but then everything remains coherent and as expected for a while. In that case, can’t that be
evidence that you are not in a state of global hallucination after all?11
I agree that this might be the case. After all, youmight have reasonable background knowledge
about how long hallucinations typically last and how they unfold that might constitute evidence
that you are not hallucinating after everything remains coherent and as expected for a while. At
the same time, there is excellent reason to think that there are ‘supercharged’ defeaters. Consider
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a case in which you are abducted by evil scientists who tell you that they will take your brain
out of your skull, hook it up to a supercomputer and stimulate it such that you have deceptive
experiences as of being in Cockaigne. When you wake up you do indeed have experiences as of
being inCockaige, with experiences as of roasted pigswalking aroundwith knives in their backs to
facilitate carving, grilled geese flying directly into your mouth, and so on. Suppose you remain in
this predicament for the rest of your life, being painfully aware of this fact. You clearly do not arrive
at a point at which you have evidence that you are not being deceived, simply because everything
remains coherent and as expected for a while. On the contrary, it is clear that in this case you have
a ‘supercharged’ defeater that doesn’t go away. Calling the possibility of such defeaters into doubt
is thus not something that champions of PC can reasonably hope to do in order to rescue their
view.
Third, couldn’t phenomenal conservatives simply embrace PC’s Key Commitment and the con-
sequence that B does have justification for the relevant propositions. Might they even add that,
from where they stand, this consequence is not all that problematic?
Of course, they can.Any champion of any viewwhatsoever can simply acceptwhatever unpalat-
able consequences their view entails and claim that they are not all that problematic, at least
from where they stand. This does not mean that their view isn’t refuted by the unpalatable con-
sequences, nor that we don’t have good reason to take it to be so refuted. If this isn’t immediately
obvious, consider a champion of the view that there are true contradictions and that explosion
holds (TC+E). Suppose that, when presented with the objection that TC+E has many unpalat-
able consequences, including that any proposition whatsoever is true, the champion of TC+E
responds by telling us that they simply embrace these consequences. Suppose they were to add
that, from where they stand, this consequence is not all that problematic. After all, it’s just what
one you’d expect if their view were true.
I expect sympathisers of PC to object that the case of PC is very different from TC+E in a way
that renders PC much less problematic. Unfortunately, it’s not even clear that this claim stands
up to closer scrutiny. To see why not, consider:
Case 3. C is an agent to whom it seems that (i) all defeaters for believing what seems
to them to be the case are misleading, (ii) that there are true contradictions, (iii) that
explosion holds, and (iv) that justification is closed under entailment.
While TC+E entails that any proposition whatsoever is true, PC entails that C is in a position
to acquire justification for believing any proposition whatsoever. I take it to be clear that both
consequences are equally unpalatable. Now, champions of PC and TC+E alike may tell us that
they embrace the relevant consequence of their view and continue to insist that it is not really
that problematic from where they stand. All that means, however, is that we won’t be able to
argue them out of their views. It does not mean that their view isn’t in serious trouble. On the
contrary, it clearly is.
4 RESTRICTED PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM
Even if PC can’t be right, couldn’t phenomenal conservatives hold out hope that some restricted
version of PC might still work? More specifically, phenomenal conservatives might try to identify
a further property, call it J, that seemingsmust have in order to confer prima facie justification and
that the problematic kind of seeming B has in Case 2 simply doesn’t have. Now, if it turned out
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that there is such a property J, champions of PC would have reason to replace PC by the following
general principle:
PC+J. If it seems to one that p and one’s seeming that p has property J, then one has
prima facie justification for believing that p.12
Recall that I considered phenomenal conservatism as a way for internalists to hold on at least
to a limited form of internalism. It is versions of phenomenal conservatism that internalists might
retreat to in the light of the arguments from Section 1 that I am interested in here.What thismeans
for present purposes is that I will focus on internalist versions of PC+J. What we are looking for,
then, is an internalistically respectable property, J, such that (i) seemings that have J confer prima
facie justification and (ii) the problematic kind of seeming B has in Case 2 doesn’t have J.
Unfortunately, there is excellent reason for thinking that there is no J that fits the bill. To see
this, I will start with a slight detour. Its relevance will become clear in due course.
Consider the following case:
Case 4. As a side-effect of live-saving medication, D has suffered from total amnesia.
When D wakes up, they see the sun shining through their window, the bed they are
in, etc.
While D has lost their memories, upon seeing the sun shining through the window, D knows
that the sun is shining. And upon seeing themselves in a bed, D knows that they are in a bed. If so,
they must also have justification for believing what they know. All of this is, of course, entirely as
phenomenal conservatism would have it. After all, A does have the relevant perceptual seemings.
Consider next:
Case 5. In their sleep, E is abducted by an evil scientist who takes E’s brain out of
their skull, places it in a vat with nutrients and hooks it up to a supercomputer. The
evil scientist erases E’s memory of the past and now stimulates their brain to make
it seem to E that they wake up in the morning, that the sun is shining through their
window, that they are in a bed, etc.
Suppose, as we may, that D and E are internal duplicates. Just like D, E has justification for
believing that the sun is shining, that they are in a bed, etc. In fact, one of the central motivations
for internalist views is that they can accommodate this data point.13 And the reason why PC can
do so is, of course, that D and E have exactly the same seemings. Now, I take it that a condition
of adequacy on any internalistically respectable J that PC+J accommodate these intuitions also.
If so, D and E’s seemings must both have property J.
With this point in play, consider:
Case 6. F is an agent who is exactly like E with one exception: The evil scientist also
makes it seem to F that not all defeaters for believing what seems to them to be the
case are misleading.
Now, F is just like D and E, except that F has one additional seeming. Note that this seeming is
generated in the sameway as the other seemings Fhosts, i.e. bymeans of an intervention of the evil
scientist. And there is nothing in F’s perspective that could provide themwith reason to think that
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the seeming shouldn’t be taken at face value. After all, F’s other seemings don’t speak to this one
and, thanks to F’s memories having been erased, their background beliefs are too impoverished to
have any bearing on the issue. By the same token, there is reason to think that F’s seemings have
J also.
Finally, consider:
Case 7. G is an agent who is exactly like E with one exception: The evil scientist also
makes it seem to G that all defeaters for believing what seems to them to be the case
are misleading.
The trouble for champions of PC+J is that if F’s seemings have property J, then so will G’s.
After all, just as in the case of F, there is nothing in G’s perspective that could provide them with
reason to think that the seeming that all defeaters for believing what seems to them to be the case
are misleading shouldn’t be taken at face value. Again, G’s other seemings don’t speak to this one
and, thanks to G’s memories having been erased, their background beliefs are too impoverished
to have any bearing on the issue. If so, there is reason to think that G’s seemings have property J,
just like F’s.
But, of course, if G’s seemings have property J, then G’s seeming that all defeaters for believing
what seems to them to be the case are misleading has property J. This means that any attempt to
identify an internalistically respectable property, J, such that (i) seemings that have J confer prima
facie justification and (ii) the problematic kind of seeming B has in Case 2 doesn’t have J is bound
to remain unsuccessful. In fact, we can now see that PC+J incurs the following key commitment:
PC+J’s Key Commitment. For G, prima facie justification will always convert to
ultima facie justification: if it seems to G that p, then G has justification for believing
p.
It goes without saying that this commitment just as problematic as PC’s Key Commitment in
Section 2. PC+J leaves phenomenal conservatives no better off than PC.
Again, before moving on, I will consider a couple of responses on behalf of champions of
PC+J. First, couldn’t champions of PC+J insist that seemings only give prima facie justification
relative to a sufficiently rich stock of background beliefs? Since in the above cases, the agent’s
background beliefs are impoverished by memory loss, their seemings don’t give them even prima
facie justification.
Two points by way of response. First, this kind of move threatens to lead to the wrong verdict in
ordinary cases of knowledge such as Case 4. Recall that, despitememory loss, D comes to know for
instance that the sun is shining upon seeing it. If memory loss prevents seemings from conferring
prima facie justification, then D’s seemings don’t give them justification that the sun is shining.
If so, D doesn’t know that it is shining either. Second, we can easily amend Case 7 such that
we have our evil scientist implant a whole slew of background beliefs into G that are all highly
coherent with each other and with G’s seeming. Perhaps our evil scientist has G believe a rich
story centred on the idea that they are an oracle, gifted by God with a unique capacity to host
infallible seemings.14 In that case, G’s seeming that all defeaters for believing what seems to them
to be the case are misleading will confer justification, even if we agree that seemings only do so
given sufficiently rich stock of background beliefs. At the same time, none of this serves to reduce
the extent to which PC+J’s Key Commitment is problematic.
200 KELP
But couldn’t internalist champions of PC+J insist that the above cases are at least highly abnor-
mal and so don’t carry much evidential weight?15
To answer this question, it may be worth reflecting on exactly how the kind of response we
are considering might enable champions of PC+J to rescue their view. To this end, let’s begin by
asking how abnormalitymay undermine evidential weight in cases of radical deception. There are
three ways in which this might happen: abnormality may get in the way of correctly gauging (i)
whether the cases are really possible; (ii) how the target view applies to the cases; or (iii) whether
the target view’s prediction about the cases are really mistaken.
Now, radical deception cases arewidely agreed to be possible.Moreover, as I alreadymentioned,
radical deception cases are among the central motivations for internalist accounts of justification.
As a result, we may expect internalist champions of PC+J, whom I am engaging here, to grant
the possibility of these cases. Once we allow that cases involving evil scientists radically deceiving
agents with the help of supercomputers are possible, there is every reason to think that all of the
above cases involving radical deception are possible also. After all, the only differences between
them concern the details of how the evil scientists deceives their victims. This means that (i) is
not the problem.
Moreover, there is not really any issue with how PC+J applies in these cases. It is clear that, in
Case 6, PC+J predicts that G has justification for believing the propositions that seem to G to be
the case. As a result, (ii) isn’t the issue either.
This leaves (iii), i.e. that abnormality gets in the way of correctly gauging whether PC+J’s
predictions about the cases are mistaken. The thought is that our judgement is less trust-
worthy in radical deception cases because they are so abnormal. That’s how radical decep-
tion cases might not carry the evidential weight needed to cause serious trouble for the target
view.
With this point in play, I’d like to focus on what is required to develop this point into a suc-
cessful defence of PC+J. Champions of PC+J will have to hold that the problematic predictions
of their view are actually true. After all, what PC+J has to accommodate are the epistemic facts
on the ground. Merely establishing that a certain judgement isn’t as trustworthy as we would like
it to be won’t rescue the view if the judgement is nonetheless true. Holding that the problematic
predictions are true is what the result that certain judgements are less trustworthy prepares the
ground for. In other words, what the kind of attack on the evidential weight of abnormal cases we
are considering here is meant to do is to make ‘biting the bullet’ palatable.
The trouble is that there is excellent reason to think that biting the bullet is not an option of
champions of PC+J. To see why not, consider:
Case 8. H is an agent who is exactly like E except: The evil scientist also makes it
seem to H that (i) all defeaters for believing what seems to them to be the case are
misleading, (ii) that there are true contradictions, (iii) that explosion holds, and (iv)
that justification is closed under entailment.
As we have already seen, PC+J entails that agents like H to whom it seems that (i) – (iv) hold
are in a position to acquire justification for believing any proposition whatsoever.
To develop the point about evidential weight into a defence of their view, champions of PC+J
will have to hold that this prediction is actually true, i.e. that H is indeed in a position to acquire
justification for believing any propositionwhatsoever. The point about evidential weight of abnor-
mal cases is meant to make this commitment palatable, here by calling into doubt the trustwor-
thiness of our judgement to the contrary.
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Unfortunately, there is excellent reason for thinking that this strategy carries little promise here,
for two reasons. First, our judgement that H isn’t in a position to acquire justification for believing
any proposition whatsoever is not grounded in reasoning about Case 8. Rather, it is a direct conse-
quence of the widely recognised fact that there is no human agent such that they are in a position
to acquire justification for believing any proposition whatsoever. But since our judgement doesn’t
require reasoning about the case, there is simply no reason to think that itmay have been led astray
by its abnormality. Second, even if we set this aside, the fact remains that this result is simply
not palatable (for reasons set out in Section 2). Some bullets are just too big to bite. This is one of
them.
5 PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM ABOUT PERCEPTUAL
JUSTIFICATION
But couldn’t phenomenal conservatives at least retreat to a version of the view according to which
seemings of particular kinds are justifiers?Whilewemay of course consider awide variety of kinds
of seemings, in view of the fact that this issue is about perceptual evidence, I will here focus on
the question of whether phenomenal conservatives might not be able to retreat to the claim that
perceptual seemings are justifiers. In other words, I want to ask whether, even if PC and PC+J are
abandoned, the following principle might not be viable instead:
Perceptual PC. If it perceptually seems to one that p, then one has prima facie justi-
fication for believing that p.
Now, it is hard to deny that the kind of seeming that causes the trouble for PC—the seeming that
all defeaters for believing what seems to them to be the case are misleading—is not a perceptual
seeming. In fact, it is hard to see how this seeming could be a perceptual seeming. As a result, the
above problem simply won’t arise if we retreat from PC to Perceptual PC.
I agree that this retreat does avoid the problem. However, it does raise an important challenge
for champions of Perceptual PC. Theywill have to answer the questionwhat distinguishes percep-
tual seemings, which do provide justification, from the kinds that don’t. (To keep things simple, I
will hereafter refer to kinds of seemings that don’t provide justification as X-seemings.) Of course,
the answer cannot appeal only to properties that perceptual seemings have in virtue of being seem-
ings in general. After all, any such propertywould be shared byX-seemings and sowould not serve
to explain the difference we are now looking for. Moreover, the answer cannot appeal to a general
property (such as J) thatmight be thought to further restrict the conditions under which seemings
confer prima facie justification, for reasons set out in Section 3. Instead, phenomenal conserva-
tives will have to appeal to properties that perceptual seemings have in virtue of being perceptual
in particular.
While I don’t have any conclusive reason for thinking that this cannot be done, here is some
reason for pessimism. Even if we agree that perceptual seemings are justifiers and that X-seemings
aren’t, the question as to whether there are kinds of seemings other than perceptual ones that are
justifiers should remain open. Suppose, then, that there are other kinds of seemings that are justi-
fiers. For instance, let’s suppose thatmemorial seemings are justifiers aswell. In that case, it would
have to be properties that memorial seemings have in virtue of being memorial in particular in
virtue of which memorial seemings are justifiers. But now notice that it would be a metaphysical
coincidence of fantastic proportions that perceptual and memorial seemings (as well as perhaps
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other kinds) have the right kinds of properties to make them justifiers, while X-seemings don’t.
The reason I am pessimistic about the retreat to Perceptual PC is that it would commit phenom-
enal conservatives to just this metaphysical coincidence.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that the correct epistemology of defeat must be externalist and so internal-
ism must be false. What’s more, cases of defeat also mean trouble for phenomenal conservatism,
which is the perhapsmost popular general view of basic justification amongst contemporary inter-
nalists and one that internalistsmight still have hoped to hold on to. Finally, there is even reason to
be pessimistic about retreating further by restricting phenomenal conservatism to specific kinds of
seeming, notably perceptual seemings. As a result, today’s news for internalists and phenomenal
conservatives is bad.16
ENDNOTES
1 Classic defences of internalism include BonJour (1985), Chisholm (1977), and Conee and Feldman (2004). For
more on the internalism/externalism divide, see Kornblith (2001).
2 For more on defeat see e.g. Bergman (2006), Lackey (2008) and Pollock (1984).
3 Thanks to Juan Comesaña and Matt McGrath for bringing this to my attention.
4 Suppose that X disregards the defeater and operates on the patient. It is entirely appropriate to admonish X
afterwards as follows: “What happened there? The doctor told you that you are not a doctor and to step away
from the patient.” Moreover, it makes sense for X to respond with an apology and an excuse, rather than stand
their ground. “I’m sorry. I had taken this new drug andwas under the impression that I was a doctor and that the
doctor who told me this was a notorious drug abuser.” is an appropriate response. “What are you talking about?
I had excellent reason to think that I am a doctor and that the person who told me otherwise was a notorious
drug abuser.” isn’t. This provides further evidence that X’s belief that they are a doctor isn’t justified.
5 Suppose that Y takes the defeater at face value and doesn’t operate. It is entirely appropriate to admonish Y
afterwards as follows: “What happened there? You knew that you are a doctor and that the person who told you
otherwise is a notorious drug abuser.” Again, it makes sense for X to respond with an apology and an excuse,
rather than stand their ground. “I’m sorry. I don’t knowwhat came over me.” is an appropriate response. “What
are you talking about? I had excellent reason to think that I amnot a doctor.” isn’t. This provides further evidence
that Y’s belief that they are a doctor is justified.
6 Champions of PC include Huemer (2001, 2007), McGrath (2013), Skene (2013) and Tucker (2010). For useful
overviews see Huemer (2014) and Moretti (2015). For further discussion of PC see e.g. Tucker (2013). Note that
PC also often features an additional pro tanto proviso, i.e. that seemings give some justification for believing.
Since this is of little consequence for present purposes, I will set it aside here.
7 This is not to say that there aren’t any further problems. See e.g. Markie (2006), Siegel (2013) for the perhaps
most important problem stemming from cases of cognitive penetration.
8 Note that what seems to one to be the case and what evidence one has is largely a contingent matter. This is why
we may, in addition, assume that B has no seemings inconsistent with and no other evidence bearing on the
proposition that all defeaters to what seems to B to be the case are misleading. Note also that BonJour’s (1980)
famous clairvoyant case makes similar assumptions about its protagonist’s evidence. But even if you think that
there are important differences, it is easy enough to fill in the details of the case to make the above plausible. I
will give one way of doing so in Section 3 below.
We may also assume that B’s seeming is as high quality as seemings get (which is why the pro tanto proviso
does not matter for present purposes). As a result, we may even assume that B justifiably believes that that all
defeaters for believing what seems to them to be the case are misleading because they form this belief based on
this seeming. Now, I am not convinced that these additional assumptions are needed to get the argument against
PC off the ground. However, the fact that they can be made may help to forestall some looming worries.
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9 Suppose someone tells you that all defeaters for believingwhat they tell you aremisleading. Given that testimony
is a source of justification in the sense that you have prima facie justification for what you are told, you now have
a defeater defeater for every defeater for believing what this person tells you. If they go on to tell you that P1 –
P3, you are justified in believing P1 – P3. However, that’s implausible. By the same token, the above argument
against PC proves too much. It generates a problem for everyone, not just for champions of PC.
In response, note that any view of testimony that does entail that you are justified in believing P1 – P3 does
face a serious problem. Note also that not every view of testimony delivers this result. Strikingly, more robustly
externalist views such as e.g. Goldberg (2010), Greco (2020) and knowledge first views such as e.g. Sutton (2007)
don’t. In this way, there is reason to believe that the argument doesn’t generate a problem for everyone. By the
same token, rather than exculpating PC, the argument inculpates views of testimony according to which you
come out as justified in believing P1 – P3.
A further question is whether there are any internalist views of testimonial justification that can avoid this
problem. While this is a fascinating question, I will not try to settle it either way here. Fortunately, I don’t have
to. After all, for present purposes, all that needs to be shown is that the problem isn’t a problem for everyone.
The fact that there are externalist accounts of testimony that avoid the problem establishes as much.
10 Thanks to Matt McGrath for raising this issue.
11 Again, thanks to Matt McGrath for this.
12 McGrath (2013) and Siegel (2013) can be viewed as pursuing this kind of strategy.
13 This is the new evil demon problem. For the original statement as a problem for process reliabilism see Lehrer
and Cohen (1983) and Cohen (1984). For an argument that the problem arises for externalist accounts of justifi-
cation more generally see Wedgwood (2002).
14 It may be worth bearing in mind that we are still considering internalist versions of PC+J. This means that E’s
beliefs can only be constrained by properties that are internalistically respectable – the fact that these beliefs are
all false or unreliably formed is irrelevant. Of course, champions of PC+J might insist that these beliefs must be
justified. But, of course, we are free to describe the case such that the evil scientist furnishes E not only with the
beliefs but also with the corresponding memorial seemings that justify them.
15 Thanks to Matt McGrath for pressing me on this.
16 Thanks to Juan Comesaña, Matt McGrath, Luca Moretti and Mona Simion for helpful comments on this paper.
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